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CAN PUBLIC TRUST RIGHTS RE-EMERGE? 
THE TAKINGS CLAUSE IMPLICATIONS OF 
UNITED STATES v. 32.42 ACRES OF LAND 
Justin R. Masterman* 
Abstract: In 2005, the United States took by eminent domain about 32.42 
acres of prime San Diego coastland that had been subject to California’s 
public tidelands trust. In the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Califor-
nia State Lands Commission argued that although the state public trust 
may not apply to the land while in federal hands post-taking, the trust 
should re-emerge to burden the property if the federal government later 
transfers it to a private party. In 2012, the Ninth Circuit rejected this ar-
gument, holding in United States v. 32.42 Acres of Land that the federal tak-
ing permanently extinguished the state public tidelands trust applicable to 
the property. This Comment argues that in terminating the state public 
trust on the San Diego property, the Ninth Circuit failed to consider the 
degree to which its decision enables unconstitutional evasion of the pub-
lic use requirement of the Takings Clause by facilitating economic devel-
opment takings that eliminate a vast amount of public benefit but create 
relatively little in return. 
Introduction 
 The City of San Diego, visited by millions every year, is home to 
seventy miles of beaches.1 The city is also home to several large installa-
tions of the United States Navy, including Naval Base San Diego, the 
principal homeport of the Pacific Fleet, and Naval Base Point Loma, 
containing seven submarines and numerous support installations.2 The 
Navy is the city’s largest employer, with fifty-four thousand active duty 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2012–2013. 
1 San Diego Convention & Visitors Bureau, San Diego 2012 Fast Facts 4 (2012), 
available at http://www.sandiego.org/~/media/a4c266bc10254b58b5049c408c26c9fe/2012 
%20fast%20facts.pdf; Important Facts and Figures, The City of San Diego, http://www. 
sandiego.gov/economic-development/sandiego/facts.shtml (last updated Mar. 1, 2011). In 
2011, over 31.1 million people visited San Diego. San Diego Convention & Visitors Bu-
reau, supra. 
2 Naval Base Point Loma History, Commander, Navy Installations Command, http:// 
www.cnic.navy.mil/PointLoma/About/History/index.htm (last visited July 12, 2013); Wel-
come to Naval Base San Diego, Commander, Navy Installations Command, https://www. 
cnic.navy.mil/sandiego/index.htm (last visited July 12, 2013). 
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and reserve employees, accounting for nearly eight percent of the city’s 
total employment.3 
 In May 2005, the United States used its eminent domain power to 
acquire about 32.42 acres of filled and unfilled tide and submerged 
lands (the “Property”) in San Diego on behalf of the Navy, which had 
leased the parcel continuously since 1949.4 The taking itself was not out 
of the ordinary; the federal government filed a declaration of taking 
and a complaint in condemnation in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of California.5 The court denied objections to 
the taking by both the San Diego Unified Port District (the “Port”) and 
the California State Lands Commission (the “Lands Commission”).6 A 
jury trial subsequently determined the amount of just compensation 
owed to the landowner, the Port.7 
 What was out of the ordinary was the Property itself. At the time 
California joined the Union in 1850, this parcel was entirely underwa-
ter and subject to California’s public tidelands trust.8 The Lands Com-
mission, on appeal to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, argued that although the public trust does not apply to the 
land while it is in federal hands, the trust should re-emerge to burden 
the Property if the federal government later transfers it to a private 
party.9 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals rejected this argument, ruling 
in United States v. 32.42 Acres of Land that the federal taking perma-
nently extinguished the state public tidelands trust applicable to the 
land.10 
 Whether the federal government, when exercising its eminent 
domain power, had the authority under the Constitution to perma-
                                                                                                                      
3 City of San Diego, Cal., Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 307 (2012), 
available at http://www.sandiego.gov/comptroller/reports/pdf/120131cafr2011.pdf. 
4 United States v. 32.42 Acres of Land, 683 F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 2012). 
5 Complaint in Condemnation at 1–3, United States v. 32.42 Acres of Land, No. 3:05-
CV-01137-DMS-WMC, 2009 WL 2424303 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2009), ECF No. 1; Declaration 
of Taking at 1–2, 32.42 Acres of Land, 2009 WL 2424303 (No. 3:05-CV-01137-DMS-WMC), 
ECF No. 2. 
6 Order: (1) Overruling Defendant San Diego Port District’s Objections to the United 
States’ Taking of Property by Eminent Domain; and (2) Denying Defendant California 
State Lands Commission’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 12, 32.42 Acres of Land, 2009 
WL 2424303 (No. 3:05-CV-01137-DMS-WMC), ECF No. 24. 
7 32.42 Acres of Land, 683 F.3d at 1033; Verdict, 32.42 Acres of Land, 2009 WL 2424303 
(No. 3:05-CV-01137-DMS-WMC), ECF No. 113. The total amount of compensation was 
$2,910,000. Id. 
8 See 32.42 Acres of Land, 683 F.3d at 1033. 
9 Brief of Appellant California State Lands Commission at 6, 7–8, 32.42 Acres of Land, 
683 F.3d 1030 (No. 10–56568), ECF No. 11. 
10 32.42 Acres of Land, 683 F.3d at 1039. 
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nently extinguish a state’s public trust rights in its tidelands was a mat-
ter of first impression in U.S. appellate courts.11 This Comment argues 
that although the concept of quiescent public trust rights was rejected 
by the Ninth Circuit, the court failed to recognize the degree to which 
its decision may enable dangerous circumvention of the public use re-
quirement of the Takings Clause by opening the door to economic de-
velopment takings that eliminate a vast amount of public benefit—in 
the form of a permanently extinguished public trust—but create rela-
tively little in return.12 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 When California was admitted to the Union in 1850, the state ac-
quired title to the 32.42 acres of filled and unfilled tide and submerged 
lands in dispute.13 In 1911, the California legislature conveyed the 
Property, subject to the state’s public tidelands trust, to the City of San 
Diego.14 In 1949, the United States Navy leased the Property for an ini-
tial period of fifty years, retaining an option to renew for an additional 
fifty years.15 In 1963, San Diego transferred the Property to the Port, 
subject to the public trust and the lease to the Navy.16 Over time, the 
Navy’s expansion of its facilities filled much of the originally submerged 
lands, leaving only 4.88 acres of the parcel submerged.17 
 In 2005, the Navy decided that—rather than lease the Property—it 
preferred to own the land in fee simple.18 Therefore, in May of that 
year, the United States filed a declaration of taking and complaint in 
condemnation in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
                                                                                                                      
11 See United States v. 11.037 Acres of Land, 685 F. Supp. 214, 217 (N.D. Cal. 1988) 
(ruling that condemnation of California tidelands by the United States extinguished the 
state’s public trust easement in the land); United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. 
Supp. 120, 124–25 (D. Mass. 1981) (ruling that condemnation of Massachusetts’ tidelands 
did not extinguish the state’s public trust easement in the land). 
12 32.42 Acres of Land, 683 F.3d at 1039; see infra notes 72–85 and accompanying text. 
13 32.42 Acres of Land, 683 F.3d at 1033. Before a state joins the Union, title to its navi-
gable waters and tidelands are held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the fu-
ture state. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 50 (1894). Under the equal-footing doctrine, when 
a state does enter the Union, it receives sovereignty and jurisdiction over the submerged 
lands within its borders from its trustee, the United States. See Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 
U.S. 212, 230 (1845). 
14 Act of May 1, 1911, 1911 Cal. Stat. 1357. 
15 Complaint in Condemnation, supra note 5, at Schedule E. 
16 32.42 Acres of Land, 683 F.3d at 1033. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
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California.19 In addition to taking the Property in fee simple, the com-
plaint explicitly declared the government’s condemnation of the Cali-
fornia tidelands trust rights applicable to the Property.20 
 The Lands Commission moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that the federal government did not have the authority to permanently 
extinguish California’s public trust rights.21 The district court denied 
the motion in April 2006 and a jury trial was held to determine the 
amount of just compensation.22 The Lands Commission appealed the 
final judgment of the district court, entered in August 2010, to the 
Ninth Circuit.23 
                                                                                                                      
19 Complaint in Condemnation, supra note 5; Declaration of Taking, supra note 5. The 
Navy’s decision to file the condemnation action may have been an attempt to prevent lease 
disputes with the Port and Lands Commission. See 32.42 Acres of Land, 683 F.3d at 1033. In 
1996, the Navy had exercised its option to renew its lease of the Property, but the Port and 
Lands Commission opposed the extension on the grounds that the lease was invalid. Id. In 
response, the United States brought a condemnation action to enforce its leasehold interests 
in the Property. Complaint in Condemnation, United States v. 32.38 Acres of Land, No. 3:99-
CV-01662-W-RBB (S.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2002), ECF No. 1. The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the United States, but that order was later withdrawn as part of a settle-
ment agreement giving the Navy a leasehold interest in the property through August 8, 2049. 
Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; Denying Defendants’ Mo-
tions for Summary Judgment, 32.38 Acres of Land, No. 3:99-CV-01662-W-RBB, ECF No. 39; 
Consent Order Entering Final Judgment, 32.38 Acres of Land, No. 3:99-CV-01662-W-RBB, 
ECF No. 65. 
20 Complaint in Condemnation, supra note 5, at 2. 
21 Notice of Motion and Motion of Defendant California State Lands Commission for 
Summary Judgment, 32.42 Acres of Land, 2009 WL 2424303 (No. 3:05-CV-01137-DMS-
WMC), ECF No. 15; Memorandum of Points and Authorities of Defendant California State 
Lands Commission in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment at 7–12, 32.42 Acres of 
Land, 2009 WL 2424303 (No. 3:05-CV-01137-DMS-WMC), ECF No. 16. In the motion, the 
Lands Commission argued that (1) the principles outlined in Illinois Central Railroad 
Company v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), are unlawfully violated if the United States per-
manently divests the citizens of California of their absolute public trust rights in the Prop-
erty, and (2) the equal-footing doctrine forbids the United States from eliminating Cali-
fornia’s title in the tide and submerged lands that the state acquired when it joined the 
Union. Memorandum of Points and Authorities of Defendant California State Lands 
Commission in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, supra, at 5, 6. 
22 Order, supra note 6; see Verdict, supra note 7, at 1 (holding that the proper amount 
of compensation was $2,910,000). 
23 32.42 Acres of Land, 2009 WL 2424303, at *1–*3; Notice of Appeal at 1–2, 32.42 Acres 
of Land, 2009 WL 2424303 (No. 3:05-CV-01137-DMS-WMC), ECF No. 122. 
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II. Legal Background 
A. Eminent Domain 
 The federal eminent domain power is not derived from the Con-
stitution, but is an inherent attribute of governmental sovereignty.24 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which prohibits the fed-
eral government from taking private property unless it is done so for 
public use and in exchange for just compensation, functions as a limita-
tion on this inherent authority.25 In addition to private property, the 
Supreme Court has ruled that state land can also be lawfully con-
demned.26 The Takings Clause applies to the states through its incor-
poration into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.27 
 The eminent domain power lies exclusively in the legislative 
branch of the government and may not be exercised unless the legisla-
ture has authorized its use through statute.28 A taking of land by the 
federal government extinguishes all previous rights and gives the 
United States title to the property “against all the world.”29 When the 
government takes property in fee simple by eminent domain, it ac-
quires all interests in the land, even those it does not specify.30 
 The Supreme Court interprets the public use requirement of the 
Takings Clause liberally.31 For example, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a Hawaii statute creat-
ing a land condemnation scheme whereby the state took fee simple ti-
tle was taken from private lessors and transferred title directly to private 
lessees in order to reduce the concentration of land ownership in the 
                                                                                                                      
24 United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883). 
25 U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 4; Jones, 109 U.S. at 518. 
26 Okla. ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941). 
27 See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). 
28 See Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 678 (1923) (“That the neces-
sity and expediency of taking property for public use is a legislative and not a judicial ques-
tion is not open to discussion.”). 
29 See A.W. Duckett & Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 149, 151 (1924). 
30 Id. 
31 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483–84 (2005) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of the condemnation of private land for economic redevelopment purposes, 
subject to a comprehensive plan); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) 
(permitting land to be taken from one private party and given directly to another private 
party so long as the transfer is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose and com-
pensation is paid); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 30, 36 (1954) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of an act allowing the use of the eminent domain power to redevelop slum areas 
and to sell or lease the condemned land to private interests). 
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state.32 The Hawaii legislature had found that the oligopolistic land 
ownership scheme skewed the residential real estate market, inflated 
the price of land, and injured the public welfare.33 In evaluating the 
constitutionality of the statute, the Court conceded that the Takings 
Clause does not permit the condemnation of private property for the 
benefit of another private person without a justifying public purpose, 
even if compensated.34 Nevertheless, the Takings Clause allows the gov-
ernment to directly transfer land from one compensated private party 
to another if such a transfer is rationally related to a conceivable public 
purpose.35 Courts evaluate the purpose of the condemnation—in Mid-
kiff, to eliminate the deleterious effects of oligopolistic land owner-
ship—not its mechanics in deciding whether the acquisition violates the 
Takings Clause.36 
 In Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court reiterated that 
legislative determinations of what constitutes a public use are entitled 
to strong judicial deference.37 In Kelo, the Court ruled that New Lon-
don’s condemnation of private land pursuant to a comprehensive eco-
nomic development plan fulfilled the public use requirement of the 
Takings Clause.38 The plan, developed by the New London Develop-
ment Corporation, was designed to create jobs, generate tax revenue, 
and help rejuvenate downtown New London.39 The Kelo majority reit-
erated much of the Court’s analysis from Midkiff, stating that although 
the “sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of 
transferring it to another private party B,” the Takings Clause does not 
require the sovereign to open the condemned land to use by the gen-
eral public.40 Thus, the public use requirement is best understood as a 
public purpose requirement.41 Concluding that the promotion of eco-
nomic development was a long-accepted public purpose, the Court 
ruled that the takings under review in Kelo were constitutional.42 Never-
                                                                                                                      
32 467 U.S. at 233, 245. 
33 Id. at 232. 
34 Id. at 241 (quoting Thompson v. Consol. Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937)). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 244. 
37 545 U.S. at 483. 
38 Id. at 483–84. 
39 Id. at 473, 474–75. 
40 Id. at 477, 479 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244); see Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (quot-
ing Thompson, 300 U.S. at 80) (noting that the Takings Clause does not permit the con-
demnation of private property for the benefit of a private person without a justifying pub-
lic purpose). 
41 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479–80. 
42 Id. at 484–85, 489–90. 
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theless, Justice Kennedy noted in his concurrence that the Court’s deci-
sion may allow for a more stringent standard of review where “the pur-
ported benefits [of a taking] are so trivial or implausible, that courts 
should presume an impermissible private purpose.”43 
B. Public Trust 
 The concept of the public trust, under which the sovereign holds 
“all of its navigable waterways and the lands lying beneath them ‘as 
trustee of a public trust for the benefit of the people,’” originated in 
Roman law and was further developed through English common law.44 
States acquired title in these lands as trustee upon their admission to 
the Union.45 Thus, California received title, as trustee, to its tidelands 
when it was admitted to the Union in 1850.46 
 In Marks v. Whitney, the California Supreme Court considered the 
right of a private landowner to fill and develop the tidelands on his 
property as he saw fit.47 The court ruled unequivocally that the tidelands 
under review were burdened by the public trust.48 The court made clear 
that the public trust had traditionally been interpreted as enabling a 
triad of public uses: navigation, commerce, and fishing.49 Over time, far 
broader acceptable public uses of trust lands have been recognized, in-
cluding hunting, bathing, and swimming.50 The court here acknowl-
edged that one of the most important public uses of the public tide-
lands is the preservation of them in their natural state.51 Therefore, 
Marks did not have the right to fill and develop the tidelands on his 
property however he saw fit.52 
 In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County (Mono 
Lake), the California Supreme Court again examined the contours of 
the California public trust doctrine, though it did so in a different con-
                                                                                                                      
43 Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
44 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty. (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 
718 (Cal. 1983) (quoting Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 432 P.2d 3, 8 
(Cal. 1967). The public trust doctrine was first articulated in the laws of Emperor Justin-
ian: “By the law of nature these things are common to mankind—the air, running water, 
the sea and consequently the shores of the sea.” Id. (quoting J. Inst. 2.1.1). 
45 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57–58 (1894). 
46 City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda Cnty., 606 P.2d. 362, 365 (Cal. 1980). 
Tidelands are lands between the mean high and mean low tide marks. Id. at 363 n.1. 
47 491 P.2d 374, 377 (Cal. 1971). 
48 Id. at 378, 380. 
49 Id. at 380. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 381. 
64 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 40:E. Supp. 
text than in Marks.53 In Mono Lake, the plaintiffs argued that the shores, 
bed, and waters of Mono Lake—which because of municipal water di-
versions was decreasing in volume and increasing in salinity, thus ad-
versely affecting the local food chain—were protected by the public 
trust.54 The plaintiffs sought to protect the recreational and ecological 
values that the diversions compromised.55 The court agreed that the 
public trust safeguards these values, and extended public trust protec-
tions beyond navigable waters to the nonnavigable tributaries of Mono 
Lake.56 
III. Analysis 
 In United States v. 32.42 Acres of Land, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court, holding 
that federal eminent domain taking creates an entirely new chain of 
title, permanently extinguishing all other interests in the land, includ-
ing California’s public trust rights.57 The court rejected the California 
Lands Commission’s (the “Lands Commission”) arguments for a quies-
cent trust, holding that the federal government was free to convey the 
property in dispute to a private party in the future free and clear of the 
state tidelands trust.58 
 The Ninth Circuit denied the Lands Commission’s claim that the 
equal-footing doctrine requires the federal government to have a com-
pelling reason for taking submerged lands—like those on the property 
in dispute—by eminent domain.59 The court also rejected the Lands 
Commission’s argument that the public trust doctrine prohibits the 
extinguishment of the tidelands trust because such a reading of the 
                                                                                                                      
53 658 P.2d at 719–21 (examining the nature of the public trust as applied to an alpine 
lake); see Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (examining the nature of the public trust as applied to 
tidelands). 
54 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712, 715. 
55 Id. at 719; see Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (noting the public trust’s importance in protect-
ing ecological values). 
56 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712, 719. 
57 See United States v. 32.42 Acres of Land, 683 F.3d 1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2012). 
58 Id. at 1034, 1039. 
59 Id. at 1034, 1035; see supra note 13. The court stated that this argument merely re-
flected the fact that as a policy matter, the federal government has been reluctant to take 
and grant away submerged state land absent exceptional circumstances. 32.42 Acres of 
Land, 683 F.3d at 1039. As such, this policy does not legally bind the government and is 
not a limitation on the federal taking power. Id. 
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doctrine would unconstitutionally subjugate the federal government’s 
eminent domain power to state public trust law.60 
 After Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff and Kelo v. City of New Lon-
don, the hurdle over which the government must jump to satisfy the 
public use requirement of the Takings Clause is very low, especially for 
economic development takings.61 If the government prepares a rational 
plan that calls for the condemnation of land to fulfill the plan, the 
courts will strongly defer to such legislative determinations.62 Courts 
considering public use challenges need not worry that takings pursuant 
to an economic development plan may significantly benefit private par-
ties.63 Courts need not police the size of the taking or question the legis-
lative determination of the size or character of the public benefit that 
will accrue, so long as the justification for the taking is rational and it 
serves a conceivable public purpose.64 Courts need not even ensure that 
the benefits of an economic development program for which land is 
condemned actually accrue.65 Therefore, municipalities are largely free 
to craft economic development condemnation schemes that may yield 
very little public benefit or in some cases, as it turns out, none at all.66 
 Unlike the relatively slight public benefit that will satisfy the public 
use requirement of the Takings Clause after Midkiff and Kelo, the public 
trust doctrine exists for the very purpose of ensuring and preserving 
                                                                                                                      
60 32.42 Acres of Land, 683 F.3d at 1038. The court concluded that because California’s 
public trust is an expression of state law, if the state’s public trust interest in the property 
survived the federal government’s explicit attempt to take it, the federal government’s 
powers would be subservient to those of the state in violation of the Supremacy Clause. Id. 
61 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482–83 (2005) (giving “broad latitude” 
to a municipality’s determination that a comprehensive economic redevelopment of the 
city justified its use of the takings power); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 233, 
245 (1984) (permitting land to be taken from one private party and given directly to an-
other private party so long as the transfer is rationally related to a conceivable public pur-
pose and compensation is paid); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (deferring to a 
municipality’s determination that the use of its eminent domain power to redevelop slum 
areas and to sell or lease the condemned land to private interests served a public pur-
pose). 
62 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482–83; Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240–41. 
63 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485. 
64 See id. at 483, 488–89; Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241, 242. 
65 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487–88; see Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242–43. 
66 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487–88. For example, in 2009, Pfizer, the anchor of the redevel-
opment plan under review in Kelo, abandoned its plans to open a large facility in New 
London, leaving the project in shambles. Id. at 473; Patrick McGeehan, Pfizer to Leave City 
That Won Land-Use Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 2009, at A1. 
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perpetual public use.67 While the public trust was originally intended to 
protect limited public uses like commerce, navigation, and fishing, it 
has come to protect a more robust set of public activities, like hunting, 
bathing, swimming, and even the preservation of trust lands in their 
natural state.68 The public trust is not merely an indication of the 
power of states to protect certain lands for public uses, but is an affir-
mation of the duty of states to “protect the people’s common heritage” 
and to only compromise that duty in “rare cases.”69 Marks v. Whitney and 
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County (Mono Lake) 
indicate the degree to which the public trust doctrine, in California at 
least, serves as a public use preservation tool.70 As such, the public trust 
protects public use values inherent in the trust lands and courts will 
probingly evaluate actions that may damage these values.71 
  In 32.42 Acres of Land, the Ninth Circuit failed to consider the de-
gree to which its decision may enable dangerous circumvention of the 
public use requirement of the Takings Clause.72 In fact, the decision in 
this case swings the door wide open for economic development takings 
that may eliminate a vast amount of public benefit—in the form of a 
permanently extinguished public trust—but create relatively little in 
return.73 Such a scheme would result in the creation of less public 
benefit than existed before the taking, which may be a violation of the 
Takings Clause.74 
 For example, consider the repercussions of 32.42 Acres of Land if a 
municipality engages in a Kelo-like condemnation of private land for 
                                                                                                                      
67 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487–88; Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241; Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior 
Court of Alpine Cnty. (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983); Marks v. Whitney, 491 
P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). 
68 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 719; Marks, 491 P.2d at 380. 
69 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 724. 
70 See id.; Marks, 491 P.2d at 380–81. 
71 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712, 724 (noting that state courts should attempt to min-
imize, so far as is feasible, any harm to public interests protected by the public trust); 
Marks, 491 P.2d at 380. 
72 See 32.42 Acres of Land, 683 F.3d at 1039. The court limited its analysis to determin-
ing whether the equal-footing doctrine, the law of federal navigational servitude, or the 
public trust doctrine prevented the permanent extinguishment of the public trust. Id. at 
1035, 1036, 1037, 1038. 
73 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482–83; 32.42 Acres of Land, 683 F.3d at 1039; Mono Lake, 658 
P.2d at 724; Marks, 491 P.2d at 380–81. 
74 See U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 4; 32.42 Acres of Land, 683 F.3d at 1039. Eminent do-
main takings of this kind may be fundamentally irrational, and thus not subject to judicial 
deference. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488 (noting that the court will only defer to a determina-
tion that the use of eminent domain is necessary when a legislature’s “purpose is legiti-
mate and its means are not irrational” (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242–43)). 
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economic development purposes, but the land to be condemned is 
burdened by the public trust.75 The municipality in such a situation 
takes land for a public purpose, but because the public trust applies, it 
takes land that already provides extensive public benefits and serves a 
strong public purpose.76 Given that economic development takings 
sometimes produce only minor public benefits and that courts will 
generally defer to legislative determinations of public use, if the public 
use requirement of the Takings Clause is to be satisfied, courts should 
consider the following proposition.77 When X amount of public benefit 
is eliminated by a taking that permanently extinguishes the public 
trust’s provision and protection of fundamental public uses, the con-
demnation must create some amount of public use greater than X in 
order to fulfill the public use requirement of the Takings Clause.78 Ap-
plying this proposition, a legislature must assert a theory that values the 
future public uses for the condemned land more than the public uses 
protected by the public trust.79 It is difficult to imagine such a theory, 
especially given Marks and Mono Lake’s robust articulation of the gov-
ernment’s responsibility to be a conscientious steward of the public 
trust, and to only relinquish this stewardship in “rare cases.”80 
 Justice Anthony Kennedy, in his Kelo concurrence, stated that 
there might be situations that demand a “more stringent standard of 
review than that announced in . . . Midkiff,” such as condemnations 
where the benefits are “trivial or implausible.”81 Although this “de-
manding level of scrutiny . . . is not required simply because the pur-
pose of the taking is economic development,” Kennedy’s heightened 
scrutiny should apply when the purpose of the taking is economic de-
velopment and the land being taken is burdened by the public trust.82 
Such a taking has the potential to actually reduce overall public use be-
cause of the potential mismatch between a modest public benefit cre-
ated through an economic development condemnation and a large 
                                                                                                                      
75 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 474–75; 32.42 Acres of Land, 683 F.3d at 1039. 
76 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483–84; Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 724; Marks, 491 P.2d at 380–81. 
77 See U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 4; Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488; Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241, 242–
43. 
78 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488; Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242–43; Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 724; 
Marks, 491 P.2d at 380–81. 
79 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488; Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242; Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 724; Marks, 
491 P.2d 374 at 380–81. 
80 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 724; Marks, 491 P.2d at 380–81. 
81 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240–41, 242–243; 
Berman, 348 U.S. at 32, 33. 
82 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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public benefit destroyed through extinguishment of the public trust.83 
If states are to uphold the public trust responsibilities articulated in 
Marks and Mono Lake, then, at the least, economic development takings 
of public trust land deserve a more probing scrutiny, as suggested by 
Justice Kennedy in Kelo.84 At the most,  economic development takings 
of public trust land calls for a presumption of invalidity, due to the po-
tential for the streamlining of the destruction of important public use 
protections and the circumvention of the public use requirement of 
the Takings Clause.85 
Conclusion 
 Whether the federal government, when exercising its eminent 
domain power, has the authority under the Constitution to extinguish a 
state’s public trust rights in its tidelands is a question that has signifi-
cant implications for the utility and strength of the public use require-
ment of the Takings Clause. Although the notion of quiescent public 
trust rights was found to be unsupported by precedent in United States v. 
32.42 Acres of Land, the decision in that case problematically opens the 
door to economic development takings that may extinguish a vast 
amount of public benefit and create relatively little in return. If states 
are to uphold the robust public trust responsibilities articulated in 
Marks v. Whitney and National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine 
County (Mono Lake), then economic development takings of public trust 
lands should be subject to a more demanding level of scrutiny. 
                                                                                                                      
83 See id. at 488 (majority opinion); Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242–43; Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 
724; Marks, 491 P.2d at 380–81. 
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